A few months ago, I posted a quote from James K.A. Smith‘s book Thinking In Tongues. For those interested, I’ve posted below my review of it that I mentioned there. It’s more of a chapter-by-chapter summary than a critical review, as that was part of the assignment. If you don’t want a summary of each chapter, I recommend reading the introductory paragraphs and the conclusion.
Smith’s book is worth the read for those interested in a philosophical exposition of pentecostal and/or charismatic theology, or if you’re simply suspicious about the how the Enlightenment affected theology.
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James K.A. Smith has a conviction about pentecostal philosophers: They should philosophize as pentecostals rather than adopt ‘acceptable’ options available in the current fields of theology and philosophy. In the last chapter of Thinking In Tongues, the literary offspring of his conviction, he concludes a philosophical discussion on glossolalia by stating that it is “the language of an eschatological imagination that imagines the future otherwise—the foreign speech of a coming kingdom.”[1]
This concluding remark on glossolalia largely epitomizes what Thinking In Tongues is all about. Its thesis is that an implicit worldview, or “social imaginary,” lies within the pentecostal[2] spirituality, which offers a “counterinterpretation” to the regnant assumptions of culture and the academy, both of which are immersed in the presumptions of rationalism and naturalism. Smith’s task in the book is thus to make explicit the implicit worldview of pentecostal spirituality.[3] He posits the central components of this worldview can expose the “narrowness and insufficiency” of current philosophical paradigms when explicitly articulated.[4] Writing as a charismatic Christian philosopher, Smith does not give an apologetic for pentecostalism; rather, he gives an “unapologetic” explanation of the elements that make up the distinct worldview of pentecostals. This worldview however is not sectarian. “Insofar as the pentecostal and charismatic renewal has reminded the church of her pentecostal heritage,” he says, “pentecostal spirituality is a catholic spirituality.”[5] Thus the implied audience of Thinking In Tongues extends beyond the glass doors of storefront Pentecostal churches. At the same time, though, he wishes to establish the groundwork of a pentecostal philosophy that can contribute to the wider conversations occurring in Christian philosophy. In doing so, his wish is that other pentecostal philosophers will take his baton and continue running with it.
Chapter 1: “Thinking in Tongues: Advice to Pentecostal Philosophers”
In this first chapter, Smith employs Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga’s influential article, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” in order to lay out his programmatic goal of setting the groundwork for an unapologetic pentecostal philosophy. Before doing this, though, Smith suggests two primary objections that might arise against his proposal for a pentecostal brand of philosophy.[6] The first is a protestation from within the pentecostal scholarly community and consists of two parts: (a) Pentecostals probably don’t need a distinct philosophy because their theologians pursue the philosophical queries;[7] (b) If Pentecostals do need a philosophy, they can simply adopt a Christian philosophy already in circulation. In response to (a), Smith thinks theology is a “special science” done “in the church, by the church, and for the church”; philosophy, on the other hand, probes fundamental questions of ontology and epistemology.[8] For Smith, pentecostal theology is sustained by a pentecostal spirituality, and more specifically draws on conceptions from pentecostal philosophy, which also finds its footing in the particular worldview of pentecostals. Thus in response to (b), Smith argues that pentecostal philosophy should “exhibit a prophetic suspicion of the regnant paradigms in Christian philosophy and its evangelical permutations.”[9] The second imaginable objection arises (hypothetically) from the broader Christian philosophical community: what might pentecostals possibly contribute to the field? With these possible objections in views, Smith enumerates three emphases that characterize his proposal for a distinctive philosophy, all of which are adapted from Plantinga’s “Advice”: (1) the right to philosophize from distinctly pentecostal assumptions;[10] (2) the pursuit of philosophical queries from distinct commitments and the communities from which they emerge; and (3) the pursuit of such things from within a “web of worship practices that inform and inculcate a pentecostal worldview.”[11]
Chapter 2: “God’s Surprise: Elements of a Pentecostal Worldview”
Chapter 2 is Smith’s hinge chapter; if the reader misses what is there, she is unlikely to fully appreciate what comes afterwards. The philosophical engagements in chapters 3-6 are a working out of the implications put forward by the five elements of the pentecostal worldview:[12]
- Radical openness to God;
- An “enchanted” theology of creation and culture;
- A nondualistic affirmation of embodiment and materiality;
- An affective, narrative epistemology;
- An eschatological orientation to mission and justice.
Radical openness to God, or “openness to God doing something differently or new,” is the necessary condition for all the others.[13] Because the remaining four are further developed in subsequent chapters,[14] Smith spends most of his time here developing the implications of this kind of openness. A radical openness to God is the underlying premise for pentecostals’ notorious emphasis on the mysterious activity and movement of Holy Spirit. Ongoing revelation, prophecy, charismatic gifts within the ekklesia: such as these are the fruits of this radical openness. Because the gifted charismata are operational for pentecostals, Smith asserts that pentecostal spirituality is fundamentally a mode of reception.[15]
Caveat Lector: Smith is adamant that these elements are tacit, or implied, in the pentecostal understanding, which is received through the formation of pentecostal worship; “Implicit within pentecostal practice is a take on our being-in-the-world.”[16] This alternative way of seeing and describing is derived from worship practices, but spills over into the day-to-day existence of those worshiping. However, Smith believes that the narrative in Acts, the narrative of the young ekklesia empowered by God’s Spirit, is the normative model for the church catholic— not simply one for pentecostal churches. Therefore, he “unapologetically” declares that “the key elements of a pentecostal/charismatic spirituality represent the way to be authentically Christian. . . . To be Christian is to be charismatic.”[17] This
Chapter 3: “Storied Experience: A Pentecostal Epistemology”
If it was unclear before that his pentecostal manifesto is a sort of marauding attack on the assumptions of modernity, chapter 3 leaves no doubt. Smith thinks the inherited rationalism of the Enlightenment—á la Descartes and Kant—construes humans primarily as “thinking things”[18] and presupposes the universality of reason. Supposing that rational minds are really what define humans (hence the claim of universality), the enlightenment project disgracefully downplays and devalues the particularities and contingencies of embodied existence.[19] Pentecostal spirituality, therefore, is a “countermodernity” and performative postmodernism”—an “enacted refusal of rationalism.” [20] In Smith’s view, pentecostal epistemology is grounded in “narrative knowledge,” a knowledge relying more on emotive faculties and experiences than propositional beliefs. Regarding the connection of the pentecostal emphasis on “affection” with a storied epistemology, Smith says, “Narratives work on this affective register precisely because the emotions are themselves already ‘construals’ of the world.”[21] Furthermore, it is by participating in the distinct worship of pentecostals that emotions are trained to view the world in a particular way. In short, pentecostal worship shapes and inculcates a pentecostal worldview. Constructing an analogy between film viewing and worship, Smith proposes that the “prefocused narratives” in films, or the worldviews at work in them, are analogous to how pentecostal worship trains the emotions; “it is the inculcation of a preconscious hermeneutic.”[22] And it is with this distinct hermeneutic, this lens through which reality is interpreted, that pentecostals are empowered by the Spirit to imagine a world otherwise, a world not bent on power, consumption, and violence: a world in which God’s Kingdom reigns.
Chapter 4: “Shattering Paradigms, Opening the World: Science, Spirit, and a Pentecostal Ontology”
In chapter 4, Smith continues the onslaught on influences of modern rationalism by denouncing various types of metaphysical (“disenchanted”) naturalism and proposing in their stead a pentecostal ontology defined by an “enchanted” (open) naturalism.[23] As a reminder, Smith’s aim is to articulate what is oftentimes unsaid in pentecostal spirituality—in this case ideas about nature and the cosmos. In sum, a pentecostal ontology will be one grounded in the mystery of God the Spirit’s dynamic presence in creation. Unlike some “correlationist” theological projects,[24] in which one attempts to conform theological claims to the “neutral,” rational standards of secular science, Smith suggests that pentecostal philosophers not abandon their distinct commitments. Rather than concede to a kind of “interventionist supernaturalism,”[25] pentecostals should develop an ontology that does not require pawning the Spirit’s miraculous presence—the very core of pentecostal spirituality.[26] For Smith, the result of such “Holy Ghost boldness” will be a conception of nature that is ‘already En-Spirited’, one where God does not “intervene” or break laws of natures in order to be present in the world.[27]
Chapter 5: “From Beliefs to Altar Calls: A Pentecostal Critique of Philosophy of Religion”
Smith argues in chapter 5 that philosophy of religion is attentive to beliefs but not believers.[28] As currently practiced, philosophy of religion works from a paradigm in which doctrine is prior to worship and ideas trump practices.[29] He proposes that the “affective” philosophical anthropology of a pentecostal worldview challenges the Cartesian “thinking thing” assumption about doctrine and practice and also enables it to better conceive of religious practice. Having described pentecostalism as a “spirituality” rather than a theology throughout the book thus far, he sets the reader up to recognize here the potential in his wider thesis. Moreover, in relation to his argument in chapter 2, he calls upon Heidegger to make the point that “we don’t think about a world of objects; rather, we are involved with the world as traditional actors.”[30] Therefore, phenomenological attention to the religious forms of life will reveal missed observations by the “overly-cognitivist” models at work in philosophy of religion. Specifically, how practices within faith communities show us that human being-in-the-world is more oriented by desire than thinking, and will thus play out more in the practitioner’s behavior than thoughts.[31]
Chapter 6: At the Limits of Speech: A Pentecostal Contribution to Philosophy of Language”
In chapter 6, the last chapter of Thinking In Tongues, Smith constructs a dialogue with contemporary philosophy of language in order to exemplify how tongues-speech, or glossolalia, might contribute to Christian philosophical discourse in challenging and exciting ways. Using tongues-speech as a “liminal case,” his aim is to exemplify how this pentecostal distinctive offers a counterinterpretation to the regnant paradigms pervasive in the academy and culture. Methodologically, theological questions concerning tongues-speech are bracketed in this chapter, but Smith assumes that tongues-speech is indeed an authentic mode of discourse within the church. To begin his argument, Smith states that tongues-speech defies existing categories within the discipline and this defiance can illuminate philosophico-linguistic analysis. Therefore, a consideration of tongues-speech vis-à-vis phenomenology, hermeneutics, and speech-act theory will render, in Smith’s mind, a “well-rounded philosophical engagement.”[32] He reports the following conclusion: First, tongues-speech is a mode of speech that functions as a sign (or gesture), a gesture that calls into question Husserl’s phenomenological rejection of gesture as an expression.[33] Second, with respect to hermeneutics tongues-speech is communicative speech which, when mediated by interpretation, opens up the community’s horizons of expectation.[34] Third, tongues-speech is a type of speech act that does something (i.e., prays—expresses an inarticulate desire to God),[35] and the perlocutionary effect is that God might enact a healing. But tongues-speech also resists Searle’s idea that only comprehensible sentences can do something.[36] Taking up these finding, Smith closes the chapter by claiming that the action performed in the locutionary act of tongues-speech is “to effect a kind of social resistance to the powers-that-be.”[37] By this Smith does not mean that pentecostals everywhere should stage a proletariat revolt. Instead, he is alluding to the global phenomenon that the poorest and most oppressed Christians are usually pentecostal Christians.
Conclusion
Overall, Thinking In Tongues is a delightful and highly informative read, one I will heartily recommend to almost anyone decently well versed in post-liberal theology. Smith’s aversion to poorly written theology and philosophy shines forth in his articulacy, an uncanny ability to simplify difficult concepts, and his bold inclusion of personal narrative. (The latter, by the way, is a clever means of corroborating and substantiating the “affective, narrative epistemology” of pentecostal spirituality.) Moreover, I commend Smith for the Pentecostal Manifestos series he and Amos Yong are heading up, as I do think it will breed fruitful dialogue in the realm of Christian academia, a realm in which pentecostal thinking is all but scoffed at.
Alas, having said that, I do have a few criticisms to name. The first begins with post-liberal theology. How much of Smith’s “pentecostal” worldview is simply a byproduct of post-liberal minus the valorization of high-church liturgy, the necessity of creeds, and a lack of references to George Linbeck and Hans Frei? As a prominent ‘camp’ among what Smith calls the “regnant” strands of theology and Christian philosophy, post-liberalism currently stands as a ubiquitous faction among academic theologians. It appears that Smith is employing many of the same premises that they do (a cultural-linguistic approach to religion, postmodern hermeneutics, an emphasis on narrative). Second, I think Smith could have stuck closer to the post-liberals in some areas and consequently helped himself out. For example, it seems anomalous that Smith would write a book about the contours of Pentecostal thinking and then pay little attention to the doctrine of the Trinity. Moreover, I like Smith’s usage of spirituality as a means of describing lived faith as a Wittgenstenian form of life, but must this come at the expense of doctrine? These may seem like petty criticisms, and perhaps they are.
But my main strife with Smith’s book is that it offers no way of “norming” ones encounters with the Holy Spirit. Here, I believe Thomas Smail’s stress on the Spirit both proceeding from the cross and taking believers back to the cross is a needed corrective. Otherwise, what is to prevent the pentecostal triumphalism we’ve seen so much of at least since the charismatic renewal? I think the added element of cross as the characteristic of a Christian hermeneutic would have fortified his protestations against the regnant systems and “powers” of this world. What’s more subversive than God revealing himself through the cross? How much more of a counterinterpretation to the standing paradigms of hermeneutics, epistemology, and ontology can you have?
Once again, Thinking In Tongues is written with precision, and Smith’s faithfulness and sophistication are nowhere questionable. And he’s right: tongues-speech certainly challenges the assumptions of the philosophy of language. But this is only a framework, only a starting place for a distinct pentecostal philosophy. We can be sure, though, that when the philosophers whom Smith hopes will pick up and carry on his work do just that, they will undoubtedly have a friend in one who has gone before them.
[1] p. 150. All citations refer to Smith’s text, and thus I drop the use of “Ibid.”.
[2] A note of clarification is needed here. In its classical sense, Pentecostalism refers to those theological traditions affirming a “second work” of Holy Spirit baptism occurring after salvation—that is, a separate and subsequent experience of grace and sanctification through a spiritual baptism marked by tongues-speech (Assemblies of God, for example). Smith, however, uses the small-p “pentecostal” more broadly to denote “an understanding of Christian faith that is radically open to the continued operations of the Holy Spirit” (p. xvii). By doing so, pentecostal indicates a “shared set up practices” that one might recognize in Pentecostal traditions, charismatic Presbyterians or Catholics, or the so-called “third wave” movement of charismatics.
[3] His choice of “spirituality” instead of “theology” is to express his notion that pentecostal spirituality is not based on dogma or doctrine, but rather an “integration of beliefs and practices in the affections which are themselves evoked and expressed by those beliefs” (p. xix).
[4] p. xxii.
[5] p. xviii.
[6] Smith actually mentions three, but sparsely deals with the first objection—an appeal to Col 2:8—due to the unlikelihood of anyone arguing on these grounds in the philosophical community. See pp. 2-3.
[7] Note that Smith thinks both theology and philosophy are second-order disciplines that theoretically reflect on first-order spirituality or religious experience. As such (and with Wittgenstein in the mind’s eye), one might say that theology and philosophy are to spirituality what grammar is to speaking a language. See pp. 3-4.
[8] p. 4.
[9] p. 6.
[10] At this point, Smith names the five key aspects of a pentecostal worldview, but I will save naming these until the summary of chapter 2.
[11] p. 15. Thus he says, “A pentecostal philosophy will not simply be a detached philosophical reflection on charismatic phenomena; it will be a charismatic reflection on philosophical questions (p. 16).
[12] Smith utilizes a description of “worldview” from James Olthius: “A framework or set of fundamental beliefs through which we view the world and our calling in it” (p. 27). While he employs many synonyms for worldview throughout the text, fundamental to this project is his aversion to equating worldview with a system of doctrine.
[13] p. 33. Another way of describing this radical openness is to say that God is capable of shattering our “horizons of expectation,” as Gadamer called it.
[14] Likewise, I will reserve further descriptions of the other four for the remaining chapter summaries.
[15] p. 39.
[16] p. 25.
[17] p. 32. This, of course, is a rhetorical move, but nonetheless a clever one.
[18] “Thinking thing” denotes the idea that the essence of a person is thinking, thus what matters most in this world is what can be thought of and then expressed in logical propositions. See p. 54.
[19] p. 55. Smith says, “The lineaments and conclusions of universal reason are, at the end of the day, only one particular perspective writ large as if it were not a perspective but ‘just the way things really are’” (p. 57).
[20] p. 59. Smith is not attacking reason per se, but rather the reductionism inherent to rationalism. See p. 53.
[21] p. 65
[22] p. 80.
[23] Notice that chapter 4 is unmistakably Smith’s attempt to expound on his second element of a pentecostal worldview, “an enchanted theology of creation and culture.”
[24] See pp. 94-5. In these instances, one might say that theology becomes the custodian of naturalism.
[25] See pp. 93-9.
[26] Neither does it require a “naive” supernaturalism. See p. 87.
[27] Smith says that some Pentecostals have misunderstood the Spirit’s steady, “lawlike” presence in the world, and thus have found it difficult to affirm both the dynamism of the Spirit and the regularity of natural processes. See pp. 103-4.
[28] p. 110.
[29] p. 111.
[30] p. 114.
[31] p. 114.
[32] p. 126.
[33] p. 134.
[34] pp. 138-9.
[35] Rom. 8:26.
[36] pp. 145-6.
[37] p. 147.
FOR • THE • TIME • BEING 